Rethinking Politics from a Feminist Standpoint

Politicizing an Ethics of Care and Vulnerability

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I develop a philosophical account demonstrating how alternative feminist concepts, in particular an ethics of care and vulnerability, would help improve our political policies and practices. I suggest that reviewing our political institutions from a feminist standpoint allows for a rethinking of these structures and practices in a more democratic framework, opening the field to all minoritized groups that are excluded from it still. I rely on a positive account of vulnerability, understood as an inherent relational dynamic of interdependency and solidarity between embodied subjects, rather than an individual show of weakness in reaction to violence. The central question I address is: if caring relations of solidarity are a possible response to vulnerability, how can this inform politics despite the ambiguity of vulnerability itself? Is such a positive reframing of the concept even possible? In other words, how do we articulate vulnerability with violence, and can it be reframed outside of these ties to violence? First, I look at Judith Butler’s positive renewal of the concept (Butler 2004). Second, I contrast this approach to the complementary findings of Adriana Cavarero (Cavarero 2011), that would allow for the emancipation of vulnerability from its dichotomous ties to violence. These findings could have political ramifications for addressing a revisited account of vulnerability that informs alternative political institutions and practices, which I explore in the final section.

KEYWORDS

Political Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, Vulnerability, Care.

INTRODUCTION

Political institutions in modern democracies rest upon patriarchal values that favor an individualistic conception of autonomy and a competitive logic (Benhabib 1992; Cavarero 2011). This fosters a hierarchical view of political power as domination, or, as ‘power over’ (over the competition, over the people) rather than ‘power with’. There is a basic incongruence with the democratic principles they are meant to establish. Underlying this logic are first, a negative view on vulnerability; and second, a need to eradicate vulnerability by resorting to state power and by legitimating violence to maximize security (Butler 2004; 2010; Cavarero 2011). This has been
especially prominent in dealing with recent forms of terrorism or the COVID-19 pandemic for example, where situations of increased vulnerability were repeatedly addressed by referring to a vocabulary of war that frames vulnerability as something to be feared and to fight against.

The elitist and patriarchal heritage of modern democratic institutions has led to recent claims of a ‘crisis’ of democracy. This term refers to the exponential widening of the gap between electors and representatives, in terms of gender, race and class (Manin 2019). Over the last two centuries, there has been a global expansion of the political rights of women and minoritized groups in democratic regimes. Yet a growing number of electors continue to express the feeling not only of being underrepresented, but also of being unheard by said representatives, leading to mass political abstention and increased protests (Manin 2019).

Therefore, my claim is that it is not enough to make political institutions more representative to resolve the so-called ‘democratic crisis’. We also need to rethink the core values on which the system was built, and develop new ways of organizing ourselves politically based on alternative values. I suggest that arriving at a truly democratic conception of political power would be possible if the concept of vulnerability were reframed in a positive light. This would challenge the conception of power as domination and substitute the quest for security by a quest for solidarity, regulating society through caring relationships instead.

The central question I explore in this paper is: how is such a positive reframing of the concept possible? More specifically, how can we overcome the ambiguity of vulnerability, and possibly extract it from the framework of violence within which it has been conceptualized, to potentially draw political implications from it that would be beneficial to democratic societies? In the first section of the paper, I analyze Judith Butler’s approach to vulnerability as one of the first key philosophers to have proposed a positive rethinking of the concept (2004). I go on to examine the complementary findings of Adriana Cavarero (2011), who offers helpful insights on the political implications of such a positive reframing of the concept. Finally, I suggest that this positive reframing of vulnerability carries the potential for emancipating vulnerability from its dichotomous ties to violence. This could provide the political ramifications for an alternative approach to intersubjective relationships and, as such, to democracy, which I aim to develop through further research.

1. BUTLER: A RENEWAL OF VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability is commonly understood as an exposure to harm and injury. It has therefore been associated with notions of violence and death. In recent years however, there have been attempts
by feminist philosophers to shine a more positive light on vulnerability. They argue that human vulnerability should not be considered as an individual trait, but as something that is shared by all human beings (Butler 2004; 2010; Fineman 2008; Cavarero 2011). Thus, it would be grounds for political and societal unity, allowing vulnerability to have beneficial political implications. In the first section, I turn to the novel treatment of vulnerability developed by Butler.

Butler’s interest in the concept of vulnerability was motivated first in their writing of *Precarious Life* by the urgency of addressing the United States’ declaration of war against Afghanistan after the 9/11 terrorist attack on American soil in 2001 (Butler 2004, XI). Butler’s critique is aimed at former US president G.W. Bush and his discourse turned toward war and retaliation rather than grief and mourning. Butler shows that the rhetoric of acting rather than mourning supposedly ‘passively’ comes from our structurally deep-rooted fear of exposing our vulnerability, which is seen as a weakness, a lack of strength that needs to be remedied through action.

The negative conception of vulnerability comes from its etymology and common usage. ‘Vulnerability’ refers to a state in which an individual can be easily subjected to harm and manipulation, be it mentally, physically, or emotionally. It is derived from the Latin ‘*vulnus*’, which refers either to a corporal wound, to something that has been cut open, or to a moral affliction such as loss and mourning. This etymological background has led to the assumption that, to overcome vulnerability, an increased demonstration of strength is necessary to gain back the upper hand. Vulnerability is both seen as an individual failure to resist being imposed upon by others, and as a societal failure to overcome the violent state of nature that the social pact supposedly protects us from (see section 2).

Butler argues that this conception of vulnerability is problematic because it produces an escalation of violence that can only bring more destruction and harm into the world. For them, this is both morally objectionable and pragmatically detrimental to humanity. Butler does not propose to redefine vulnerability outside of the framework of violence. However, they claim that to be exposed to violence does not necessarily require repression of vulnerability and retaliation of violence with violence. They suggest that, instead, confronting the experience of vulnerability could be transformative on a personal and collective level. How does Butler justify this?

In *Precarious Life*, Butler develops an ontological account of vulnerability as the ever-present possibility for us or our loved ones to be exposed to injury and death. This is due to our inherent dependency on the actions of others and on external aggressions (environmental, societal, historical etc.). According to the author, our dependency on others derives from our being both socially constituted and embodied beings (Butler 2004, 20). Subject formation in Butler’s account...
is both bodily based and an intersubjective process. This has two consequences in our relationship to others, i.e., ‘attachment’ and ‘exposure’, from which derive the feelings of ‘loss’ and ‘vulnerability’ respectively (2004, 20). In the preface of Precarious Life, Butler defines ‘the experience of vulnerability and loss’ as the fact ‘that we can be injured, that others can be injured, that we are subject to death at the whim of another, [which the author says] are all reasons for both fear and grief’ (2004, XII). Nonetheless, Butler (2004, 30) proposes that there could be a positive outcome from maintaining the feeling of loss, or in other words mourning, rather than escalating the cycle of violence with forceful retribution:

If we stay with the sense of loss are we left feeling only passive and powerless, as some might fear? Or are we, rather, returned to a sense of human vulnerability, to our collective responsibility for the physical lives of one another?

In these lines, Butler proposes to reframe the sense of loss and vulnerability in a more positive account, which could prove to be collectively empowering. The author’s argument is that, by acknowledging and confronting the shared feeling of vulnerability when facing common harm and loss, a sense of ‘collective responsibility’ toward one another would arise. Such a collective responsibility would serve as an alternative to retaliating violence with violence and could bring about unity rather than further discord. Let us examine where this collective responsibility comes from.

Petherbridge offers a reading of Butler that highlights how this theory of vulnerability brings forth a renewed critique of ‘the liberal conception of an autonomous, individualistic subject as the norms for ethics and politics, and to replace it with one based on vulnerability and interdependence’ (Petherbridge 2018, 59). In other words, vulnerability theory provides a relational account of autonomy, which informs an interdependent account of interrelations. For Butler, no life can sustain itself on its own, meaning that embodied living beings depend on each other to maintain themselves. In Precarious Life, Butler develops the idea that by repetitively overcoming one’s own precariousness, one’s life becomes ‘a’ life, in the sense of a ‘liveable’ life. More specifically, a ‘liveable’ life would be a life in which one would not only sustain oneself but also flourish, and a life that would be considered by others as a ‘grievable’ life in the event of one’s death (Butler 2004, 19-49). Collective responsibility is therefore drawn from the interdependency and the relational autonomy that rely on an ontological definition of the concept by Butler. Petherbridge therefore states that Butler’s argument leads to a positive account of interdependency, with both moral and political implications (Petherbridge 2018, 60).
However, Petherbridge also notes that in *Frames of War* (2010), Butler later moves away from the ontological account of vulnerability developed in their former text (Petherbridge 2018, 61). In the later work, Butler addresses the points of critique their previous formulation of vulnerability has received. Petherbridge highlights that most of these critiques have pointed out the ‘fraught relation between ontological, ethical and political dimensions of vulnerability’ (Petherbridge 2018, 61). Butler answers to the objection by distinguishing between two forms of vulnerability. The first is the one that was developed in *Precarious Life*, it is ontological vulnerability, or precariousness. In *Frames of War* (Butler 2010), Butler offers a more generalized definition of vulnerability as precariousness. Moving away from its ties to loss and mourning, the author defines precariousness in broader terms as a condition for sustainability and flourishment (Butler 2010, 14). The second form of vulnerability developed by Butler specifically in *Frames of War* accounts for the social, historical, and political context of the experience of vulnerability. Butler calls it ‘precarity’. Petherbridge offers a helpful explanation of Butler’s conception of precarity: it is ‘a political condition that is shaped by social and economic relations’ (Petherbridge 2018, 61). By making the conceptual distinction between precariousness and precarity, Butler’s conception of vulnerability aims to account for differentiated experiences of vulnerability across social, racial and gender groups. Precarity is the particularization of precariousness, as it expresses itself differently for each individual depending on the context and on their social, sociological, historical and political situation. Amber Knight emphasizes the importance of Butler’s distinction of precariousness and precarity, ‘because it illuminates the different sources of our vulnerability’ (Knight 2021, 188). Therefore, the distinction opens different levels of responsibility when addressing issues of vulnerability to respond to its different sources.

To recap Butler’s account, vulnerability is reframed positively in the sense that it is a shared feeling of exposure when faced with violence, and that confronting this feeling collectively can be a transformative experience enabling us to eventually overcome such violence. However, even in this account, a positive reframing of vulnerability only emerges from being framed initially relative to violence. Instead, I propose to rethink the notion of vulnerability outside of its ties to violence. I argue that severing the ties linking vulnerability to violence is necessary to build a normative account of a more truly democratic model of politics. In section 2, I compare Cavarero’s definition of vulnerability to Butler’s, and ask whether she can offer us a way out of the framework of violence.
2. CAVARERO: A COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTION

The work of Adriana Cavarero (2011) offers a complementary analysis of vulnerability that makes the political implications of the concept more explicit. She emphasizes the ties between vulnerability and care further, providing a critique of the negative Hobbesian understanding of vulnerability which continues to inform the conception of the modern state. I suggest Cavarero’s specific treatment of violence contains an underlying radical approach to vulnerability and care, that would allow for the emancipation of vulnerability from its dichotomous ties to violence if further developed. In her book *Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence* (2011), Cavarero’s interest is not at first sight focused on vulnerability, but on violence. I will show that her approach, although dependent on the accepted link between the two concepts, opens the possibility for another interpretation of vulnerability.

Like Butler, the specific violence that Cavarero is concerned with is that of contemporary terrorism. She claims that this form of violence should be renamed ‘horrorism’ (2011). One of the major objectives of her book is to draw the conceptual lines between ‘terror’ and ‘horror’. Cavarero focuses on intentional violence caused by human beings against other human beings, with the intent to harm, kill, and more specifically, to annihilate human life and human dignity. However, there is a paradox in Cavarero’s approach to human vulnerability in the face of contemporary violence. What is this paradox?

The problem she tackles is that of an underlying tension between vulnerability as a weakness - the assumption that in all human beings lies a potential victim to harm - and the hint toward a possible positive reinvestment of the concept, as something that can be valued and regarded as the basis for action within the framework of intersubjective and societal ties. How does Cavarero address the dual meaning of vulnerability?

To answer this, let us look at the distinction she makes between ‘terror’ and ‘horror’. Cavarero characterizes terror by the fear of death and the instinct to flee to save one’s own life (2011, 4). In contrast, she relates horror to the experience of paralysis when confronted with another’s loss of human dignity (2011, 7). She defines terror as something that can be experienced collectively through movements of panic, while horror is defined by an absence of movement. It is experienced individually, and cannot be escaped, as one loses one’s faculty to move all together. How does she explain this distinction?

Cavarero argues that, whereas terror is fear in the face of imminent death, horror is initiated by disgust at the sight of violence so dehumanizing that it attacks human dignity at its core. She
suggests that death does not incite horror, while an offence to the integrity of the human body does. This includes acts of dismemberment, torture, and bombings, which are some of the key tactics used in the case of contemporary terrorist attacks. Cavarero (2011, 8) states that violence in the shape of horror is:

not content merely to kill, because killing would be too little [but it] aims to destroy the uniqueness of the body, tearing it to its constitutive vulnerability. What is at stake is not the end of a Human life but the Human condition itself, as incarnated in the singularity of vulnerable bodies.

Losing one’s dignity means losing one’s individuality, in the sense of an unnatural separation of the body into pieces that should only ever belong to a whole, leading to the loss of one’s essence. Yet, what constitutes this essence seems to be vulnerability itself. Even the words chosen to describe the object of horror are not without reminding us of the etymology of vulnerability:

The work of horror does not concern imminent death from which one flees, trembling, but rather the effects of a violence that labors at slicing, at the undoing of the wounded body and then the corpse, at opening it up and dismembering it. (Cavarero 2011, 12)

In other words, what initiates horror is the exposure of human vulnerability, in the etymological sense of a wound, something that has been cut open. How does Cavarero move away from the negative appraisal of vulnerability to a potential positive reframing of the concept? And could this positive reframing further emancipate vulnerability from its ties to violence than what Butler’s approach allows for?

Cavarero eventually moves away from a negative definition of vulnerability by suggesting that being vulnerable does not mean that one is helpless. Rather, vulnerability can initiate caring relationships. Thus, she considers ‘wounding and caring’ as ‘the two poles of the essential alternative inscribed in the condition of vulnerability’ (Cavarero 2011, 20). She acknowledges the ambiguity of vulnerability but shines a positive light on it by transforming the prior negative openness to injury into a capacity to receive help through caring relations. For Cavarero, vulnerability is an exposure to both alternatives, an openness that can go in two radically different directions. In Cavarero’s account, care is not a reaction to being wounded, as it is in Butler’s account, but constitutes an alternative to it. This allows for a fully positive reframing of vulnerability itself, not just of its consequences.
The specific distinction Cavarero proposes between helplessness and vulnerability is what helps us understand this shift (2011, 20). In her view, when we are born, we are both vulnerable and helpless, whereas as we become adults, we continue to be inherently vulnerable, but we are not condemned to a perpetual state of helplessness. Therefore, vulnerability is understood as a permanent condition, whereas helplessness is only transitory. This conceptual distinction appears to be similar to Butler’s distinction between precariousness and precarity. However, whereas precarity can be understood as the particularization of precariousness, the care on which we rely on due to our inherent vulnerability is not a consequence of helplessness, it is an alternative to it. That is why I suggest that Cavarero’s account of vulnerability offers the possibility to conceptualize vulnerability in two parallel frames that constitute alternatives to each other, rather than one being a reaction to the other.

Furthermore, Cavarero’s definition of vulnerability is the basis for her critique of a Hobbesian understanding of the concept, and of its political implications for the conceptualization of the relation between the state and violence. She uses the distinction between vulnerability and helplessness to critique the narrow view on vulnerability developed by Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (1651) and by liberal contractualist theories altogether, which have had major political repercussions on the way we understand the relationship between the state and individuals. According to Cavarero’s reading of Hobbes, vulnerability is an obstacle to security, while for Cavarero herself, vulnerability is the condition for care and solidarity. If you erase vulnerability, you erase the possibility for care and solidarity. This might lead to a society where the imperative for security trumps the need for intersubjective relationships. This would leave individuals isolated from each other, because their ties to each other would become instrumental rather than ontological or ethical.

Cavarero shows that because of this Hobbesian view on vulnerability, we have been accustomed to think of politics in terms of a competition for power, providing a controlled environment for a certain type of monopolized violence that reproduces itself. Indeed, she argues that the state’s tool to enforce such power is terror (Cavarero 2011, 80). A consequence of this, in a contractual approach to the state, is that it seems that one cannot think of political power without referring to a framework of violence because it is based on a negative view of vulnerability. Thus, Cavarero’s critique suggests that the way we define vulnerability on a societal level has a direct impact on our conception of politics.
3. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

The works of Butler and Cavarero on vulnerability offer an alternative account of interdependency, challenging the liberal conception of autonomy that informs contractarian models of politics. To think of politics outside the realm of violence, and propose an alternative model, we need to rethink the modern conception of the state and its contractualist premises. That is, we need to rethink the negative kind of vulnerability and the individualized form of autonomy described by these theories. I argue that we are dependent on others first, and then, mainly because of the care we receive from others, can we become autonomous in the highest sense.

Benhabib provides helpful insights in favor of this argument, by conducting a ‘genealogy of social contract theories’ and of the notion of autonomy they convey (1992). She focuses on Hobbes’ image of ‘men as mushrooms’ springing from the earth, the ‘ultimate picture of autonomy’ (1992, 156). Benhabib shows how the contrarian myth gets rid of all primary ties to both the mother and the father, and completely erases women from the framework. This relays a view of community as a brotherhood of sorts, a community of male siblings (1992, 157). Consequently, instead of confronting their experiences of vulnerability, the male egos that are constitutive of this idealized society work to repress experiences of vulnerability. According to Benhabib, what follows is a ‘disembedded and disembodied’ conception of autonomy that favors equality as sameness, which discounts plurality and difference (1992, 157). Instead, building on the notions of care, love and friendship, Benhabib points toward a relational conception of autonomy where inter-relations are built on complementary reciprocity between individuals, and accounts for the uniqueness of their experiences (1992, 160). Catriona Mackenzie (2018) further develops the concept of relational autonomy, shining a light on the forms of responsibility that arise from it, work which I am not able to elaborate on here but will consider in future research.

At this stage of the argument, there are two points I would like to address before concluding. First, I want to reflect on a possible objection to the claim that debates about vulnerability should move away from a framework of violence and offer a response. It could be objected that this might render invisible the real-life violent situations that vulnerable groups are effectively in. My aim, however, is not to fully abstract vulnerability from its possible ties to violence, but rather to question whether these ties are intrinsic and necessary to the study of vulnerability for politics. Some authors have answered to this objection by arguing that vulnerability is indeed irremediably linked to violence, but that the ambiguity of the concept, highlighted by both Butler and Cavarero, is what allows the concept to still function as a tool of critique (Murphy 2012; Diprose 2013). While I partially agree with some of these arguments, I suggest there might be another path to respond to the objection.
To start with, I argue that Butler and Cavarero already address this objection through their distinction between precariousness and precarity for Butler, and between vulnerability and helplessness for Cavarero. The authors clarify the difference between an ontological notion of vulnerability, and situational or contextual vulnerability, shaped by material, social, historical and economic conditions. That is precisely where the ambiguity of vulnerability lies, but this does not mean that one conception annihilates the other. Rather, the concept offers different levels of analysis that allow us to tackle issues of vulnerability both from a normative point of view and as it is experienced within the existing social reality.

Moreover, my aim is to break open the category and rupture its supposedly intrinsic ties to violence. Positively reframing the notion of vulnerability does not, however, mean disregarding social and political inequalities. I am not suggesting that we forget about its ties to violence. Rather, my proposal is that we turn the problem around, and find a different point of entry to reconceptualize it from a perspective of its ties to other notions such as trust, recognition, care and solidarity rather than loss and grief, which leave the concept open to critique and make its positive outcomes hard to consider within that framework. Without being oblivious to the injustices of how things are, my aim is not to develop a band-aid theory of vulnerability, where vulnerability would be positively embraced and reclaimed in the aftermath of violence. Instead, I suggest that the concept of vulnerability itself could help us emancipate ourselves from the framework of violence altogether, to build a world and institutions that offer more than only the possibility for resilience, reparation and compensation, but also for preventing harms by eliminating the roots from which they grow. Vulnerability allows us to address the issue from both ends, both by offering solutions to real life situations, and by outlining a normative framework to also address the sources of the problem.

Therefore, I agree with Butler and Cavarero’s positions and lines of argument in defending vulnerability as a shared and inherent human condition, but I would like to take this positive reframing of the concept a step further by trying to extract it from the framework of violence altogether. My claim is that if we continue to define vulnerability through its ties to violence, then within the political context, we end up qualifying minoritized group as ‘vulnerable’ compared to other dominant groups. This leads to a political system and institutions that aim at bridging this gap by reallocating privilege, with the idea that some groups need to catch up with the dominant group (notion of equality based on an aspiration for sameness), without allowing for a critique of the values at the core of that privilege. As Lorde suggests (1984), ‘the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house’, meaning that to change a system that is structurally flawed requires to change the institutions on which it is built. If we operate with tools that are inherently unfair,
because of the arbitrary discriminative values they reproduce, how can we address remaining injustices and build a fairer society? The question of how to transform and/or replace these tools persists, however.

Hence, what I propose is changing the paradigm altogether, by rethinking the way we organize ourselves politically based on alternative values fundamentally shared by all. Thinking through how to practically operate such a move is what I aim to achieve through future research. Re-conceptualizing vulnerability outside of its ties to violence would allow moving away from the ambiguity of the concept to fully consider it as a positive characteristic of humanity. It would no longer be understood as a lack that can either be exploited or compensated by others, but as a complete or ‘general openness toward the other’ (Petherbridge 2016, 591).

As a result, being vulnerable does not have to be something we endure or suffer from, but rather, I suggest it could be something to embrace, by putting our complete trust in one another. I argue that vulnerability does not answer to a movement of dispossession, but on the contrary, could be empowering. By giving yourself to the other, or more precisely, to the relationship with the other, you do not necessarily diminish yourself, but can sometimes gain something from the relationship, not in the sense that you benefit from it in a calculated way, but that it makes you grow even more so into who you are always on the verge of becoming. In this sense, we would be confronted with the complementary reciprocity theorized by Benhabib and mentioned before (1992).

Therefore, vulnerability would no longer need to be framed as a power-based relationship with a perpetual underlying propensity for violence, but rather, one’s vulnerability would always be woven into the other’s vulnerability, providing us with an account of vulnerability as always being inter-vulnerability. Because of this shared condition of vulnerability, vulnerability would no longer be considered as one side of a power dynamic, but rather mutual trust and solidarity.

In this context, the state and its institutions would not be limited to the role of remedying the inequalities and the injustices that riddle our democratic societies. This implies a shift in paradigm. Otherwise, in staying within the same paradigm, the role of the state is to compensate for inequalities, providing aid to those considered most vulnerable, as a way of helping them become more resilient to harm. Resilience to harm as the state’s response to vulnerability suggests that vulnerability is something to be overcome, and that this overcoming is the responsibility of the individual rather than the collective. Building a normative account of a model of politics that is truly fair and democratic means moving away from a response to vulnerability through resilience. We should aim at building a model of politics where resilience is no longer needed.
This leaves us with the remaining question, which is my second and final point: how do we justify this normative and political claim? Recent research on the topic suggests that we move away from the ethical viewpoint on vulnerability and study the concept from a more explicitly political perspective (Shulman 2011; Ferrarese 2016). The tenants of this position argue for a separation of morality and politics. Estelle Ferrarese in particular turns to care theories to overcome these difficulties. Focusing on the works of Joan Tronto and Carol Gilligan, Ferrarese states that care theories offer a conception of ‘the political as intertwined with moral contents and logics without deriving it from moral principles’ (2016, 235). Indeed, Ferrarese underscores Tronto’s argument that the concept of care ‘whose precise purpose is to handle vulnerability’, should not be considered as a moral principle severed from its social and political groundings (2016, 236). It is this line of argumentation that I wish to explore through further research on care theories.

**CONCLUSION**

To conclude, rethinking our political model of organization requires also questioning what it is to be human first. The way we think of the human condition determines the ways in which we can think of organizing ourselves politically. Although Butler and Cavarero’s approaches to human vulnerability were initiated by an analysis of violence, they propose an alternative way of thinking about vulnerability as a shared and inherent human condition. This does not completely emancipate vulnerability from the framework of violence but offers an alternative framework parallel to the initial one, allowing for a sidestep that opens the possibility for a new interpretation of human relations, and therefore, of our model of politics, based on care and solidarity. In this paper, I have analyzed the ambiguity of vulnerability and its possible re-definition under a more positive framework. I have shown that, although it has been initially thought of in relation to violence, it should be possible to break vulnerability from such dichotomous ties, as a way to bringing about its positive reframing. Finally, I have tried to explore the possible political implications of such a re-defining of vulnerability, as it transforms the way we think about our Human condition and intersubjective relationships. This proposition is still at an explorative stage and provides an outline for further research on the matter.

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