Discriminatory Desires and Disintegrated Sexual Selves

An Investigation into Selective Sexual Preferences and the Limitation of Sexual Autonomy

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ABSTRACT
This article examines the apparent tension, recently highlighted by Amia Srinivasan, between sexual autonomy and one’s responsibility to critically engage with their desires in the context of Selective Sexual Preferences (SSP). Many see SSP, criteria employed for excluding and including potential sexual partners, as a fundamental expression of one’s sexual autonomy. Simultaneously, these preferences mirror oppressive social structures and have detrimental effects on already marginalized groups. Noting this politicalness, authors like Srinivasan hold that we have an obligation to critically engage with our desires. Such engagement impedes, however, our sexual autonomy, which presupposes we are all free in developing and enacting our desires. Sexual autonomy and moral responsibility seem to be at odds. This article argues that this tension is a fabrication. More specifically, it posits that SSP are morally objectionable because they signify a limitation of one’s own sexual autonomy and that of others. To do so, this article moves beyond the dominant liberal approach to autonomy and examines sexual autonomy through the lens of Catriona Mackenzie’s Integrated Bodily Perspective. Together with empirical findings regarding effeminophobia in the gay community, this reconceptualization shows that SSP signify a twofold limitation of sexual autonomy. SSP may be a symptom of the limited sexual autonomy of the individual expressing them. As SSP reify oppressive social norms, they can contribute to the disintegration of others’ sexual perspectives, thus constituting a limitation of their sexual autonomy as well. Consequently, this article argues that sexual autonomy is not limited by our obligation of critical reflection but can rather be enhanced by it. It lastly considers the position of critical reflection and argues that while insufficient, critical reflection marks a necessary, possible, and fruitful starting point for approximating sexual justice.

KEYWORDS
Sexual Preferences, Sexual Autonomy, Responsibility, Effeminophobia, Feminist Philosophy

INTRODUCTION
In 2020, hook-up app Grindr faced widespread public scrutiny for providing its users with the option to filter out others based on their race and ethnicity (Bloodworth 2017). Though it has since removed this function, Grindr still allows anyone to filter out users based on their age, what kind of interactions they are looking for, and the subculture that users identify with. Those with a premium account have access to even more selective criteria: they may also filter out accounts
According to, among other things, the role one prefers during sex (i.e., whether they are ‘top’ or ‘bottom’), someone’s relationship status, and physical attributes such as height, body type, and even weight. Accordingly, Grindr users can shape the pool of potential sexual or romantic partners before any interactions on the app.

To some, the filters on Grindr may seem baffling. Yet choosing or excluding sexual or romantic partners based on certain selective criteria, what I call Selective Sexual Preferences (SSP), might be as old and widespread as romance, intimacy, and sex itself. Although dating apps may heighten the expression of SSP, people generally have sexual preferences. Most of us find certain people attractive and will act upon this attraction and generally people will also refrain from having sex with people whom we do not find attractive and believe that others have the right to do so as well. In this sense, dating apps and their filter options may simply be the next step in the exercise of our SSP, as they allow us to pre-emptively narrow down the pool of potential sexual partners and make finding sexual partners easier.

SSP may be widespread and widely accepted, but that does not mean they are without problems. A significant number of scholars and activists have grown wary of SSP and have pointed out their possible harmful effects. They see how our sexual preferences can be symptomatic of oppressive structures and have noted the objectification and dehumanisation of those implicated by SSP. These authors deem SSP morally objectionable and have advocated a more critical stance towards them. In this paper, I align myself with these critical voices and argue that SSP are morally objectionable. To clarify this, I first examine the relationship between SSP and sexual autonomy as well as the apparent tension between sexual autonomy and a duty to examine our desires. Subsequently, I apply Catriona Mackenzie’s notion of bodily autonomy to SSP to show that they are both a symptom and perpetuation of disintegrated sexual perspectives. In doing so I posit that SSP are morally objectionable because they impede our and others’ autonomy, and that we thus have a moral duty to ourselves and others to critically examine our desires.

SEXUAL AUTONOMY VERSUS SEXUAL RESPONSIBILITY

Before we can understand what makes SSP morally objectionable, we must explore why SSP are so deeply ingrained in our conception of sexuality and desire. Amia Srinivasan explains that the acceptability of SSP is rooted in a sex-positive approach to desire. This approach tries to free sexual desires from the restraints of moral scrutiny by promoting sexual autonomy (Srinivasan 2021, 81–82). I define the sex-positive form of sexual autonomy as the idea that all individuals have the exclusive right to shape and practice their sexual desires. Everyone should be free to
ensure they have enjoyable sex according to their preferences without being shamed (Srinivasan 2021, 83–84). Sexual autonomy also stresses that we do not owe sex to anyone. We are always free to decline someone’s advances, for example because we do not find them attractive (Srinivasan 2021, 86). Sex is thus morally permissible if all involved parties want to engage in it. SSP are simply the criteria on which someone decides whether they want to engage in sex or not. As such, they can be understood as a fundamental expression of sexual autonomy.

This common understanding of sexual autonomy is intimately embedded within a liberal approach to politics, society, and individual subjects. Liberalism has shied away from prescribing courses of action and rather centers individuals’ choices as that-to-be-promoted by politics (Nicolacopoulos 2008, 20–21; Chambers 2008, 117). It has taken great care to isolate the individual from their social context, presupposing their ability to make decisions independently and rationally. Such a presupposition relies on a stark distinction between the political sphere—where interventions are desirable and necessary—and the safeguarded private sphere—where individuals can freely develop and live out their values and goals, including those pertaining to sexual intercourse (Chambers 2008, 183). Srinivasan thus argues that ‘the norms of sex are like the norms of capitalist free exchange’ (2021, 83). Sex positivity has ceased to scrutinize desires out of a fear to dominate sexual agents through universal policies (Srinivasan 2021, 81–82). Instead, the approach respects that seemingly objectionable sexual acts can signify a positive experience for the individual (Srinivasan 2021, 83–84). What is morally relevant, then, is whether someone wants sex and the individual’s subsequent expression of consent. Accordingly, sex-positive proponents of sexual autonomy equate autonomy to independence and emphasize the individual over their socialization, treating them as rational and capable of informing and enacting their own desires. They sever the link between public life and private desires and isolate the individual much like a large portion of liberal theory does.

The problem with this view is that we are not fully autonomous subjects with isolated desires. Political norms, such as racism, sexism, and ableism, impact who and what attributes we find desirable and under what conditions and thus inform our SSP (Srinivasan 2021, 84–85). Men still tend to find white women more attractive than Asian women, for example, unless these women can conform to Orientalist tropes by being small, quiet, and submissive (Zheng 2016, 405). Within gay men’s communities, whiteness prevails as the norm for desirability unless Black and Asian men fulfil the stereotype-informed roles as strong and well-endowed sexual partners or hairless and submissive ‘bottoms’, respectively (Han and Choi 2018, 155–57). Masculinity, conventionally exemplified by being muscular, also remains favoured over attributes traditionally associated with femininity (Lanzieri and Hildebrandt 2011, 276). SSP thus often target already
marginalised groups and are often based on persistent stereotypes (Brennan et al. 2013, 393; Han and Choi 2018, 153; Zheng 2016, 404). It should come as no surprise, then, that the members of those groups feel negatively impacted by SSP. Sexual exclusion or fetishization informed by SSP is experienced as painful, objectifying, and dehumanizing (Han and Choi 2018, 155–57; Zheng 2016, 407). It also severely makes people question whether they are adequate or attractive partners and reduces their sense of sexual agency. SSP must thus be understood as political. It is this politicalness, concerning both the sources and the effects of our desire that Srinivasan targets when she states that oppressive political systems ‘[make their] way into the bedroom’ (2021, 84). This is also why she and others see (some) SSP as morally objectionable (e.g., Helligar 2018; Khawaja 2019, 44; Srinivasan 2021, 84). Like any aspect of social life, sexual desires cannot be detached from oppressive and stereotypical norms and expectations, and even though we feel justified and genuine in positing selective criteria for our intimate partners, perhaps we should not be.

At this point, a tension seems to emerge. On the one hand, we now know that SSP are not merely personal: they are also political and harmfully so. Given this problem, one may have a duty to mitigate their SSP by critically examining their desires, their sources, and their impacts (Srinivasan 2021, 90–91). Some may even say that this obliges one to expand the scope of who they have sex with. On the other hand, we cannot force anyone to have sex with anyone they do not find attractive. It may even feel wrong to demand of anyone that they critically examine their desires. The right to sexual autonomy seems to protect us from scrutiny and ‘authoritarian moralism’ (Srinivasan 2021, 86). This, however, prevents us from re-examining and changing those tendencies that can be called objectionable. Sexual autonomy and moral responsibility seem to be at odds.

An example may clarify this tension. Let us suppose there are two gay men: Nate and Irwin. Nate describes himself as a masculine man and Irwin describes himself as feminine. Irwin finds Nate attractive and asks him out. Nate, however, quickly rejects Irwin because he is only attracted to masculine men. This is not the first time that Irwin is rejected; a lot of gay men are not into ‘fems’ (Annes and Redlin 2012, 272; Hale and Ojeda 2018, 315; van der Toorn, Pliskin, and Morgenroth 2020, 160–65). We could say that Irwin is suffering from bad luck. Nate is simply into other types of men and Irwin must bear the rejection with grace. Simultaneously, we can regard Nate’s response as symptomatic of sexist thoughts and practices; effeminophobia is, after all, a pervasive phenomenon in gay communities and is likely rooted in histories of homophobia (Hunt et al. 2016, 108–9). We may observe these trends and ask Nate to reconsider Irwin as a partner. This would,
however, demand a lot of Nate, who is simply trying to have enjoyable sex. How do we find our way out of this seeming stalemate?

The apparent tension between sexual autonomy and the duty of normative reflection is not as striking as it may seem. In fact, I believe this tension need not exist at all. Viewing sexual autonomy from a different perspective reveals that SSP are not an expression but rather a limitation of one’s sexual autonomy. On this account, autonomy and normative reflection are highly compatible. I explore this idea below based on Catriona Mackenzie’s integrated bodily perspective.

THE EMBODIMENT OF SSP

Examining SSP through an account of bodily autonomy requires an explanation as to how SSP are embodied. A brief glance at the nature of sexual desires seemingly reveals this embodiment of SSP. Indeed, it seems fair to say that for many of us, sexual desire is a physical experience. Most of us experience arousal through the engagement of our bodies and the bodies of our partners, and the very state of being aroused can be described in primarily physical terms. Moreover, our selective preferences are frequently, albeit not exclusively, embodied, as we tend to choose sexual partners based on physical attributes. This is the case especially when our SSP adhere to oppressive structures such as racism, sexism, or fatphobia, precisely because categories such as race and gender are marked by the body (Bordo 2004, 11). If someone only desires Black men, the skin colour of potential partners is likely relevant; and in the case of gay men, notions of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ are intertwined with physical attributes such as having a muscular body or how expressive one’s physical gestures are (Annes and Redlin 2012, 266; Sanchez et al. 2009, 75). Masculinity and femininity are further embodied in sex between men by the roles of ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, respectively (Ravenhill and de Visser 2018, 1037). Sex and desire in general, and our SSP specifically, are thus highly embodied.

One may say that our SSP can also be based on non-physical stereotypes about members of certain groups, such as the stereotype that Latino men are more passionate (Halwani 2017, 193). It is the being passionate rather than the physical attributes of a Latino man that determine our attraction to him. However, even then are we likely to read from someone’s body whether they are a member of the group of which we hold this stereotype—i.e., whether someone looks like a Latino man and therefore is a passionate lover. Bodies remain relevant for our SSP, directly or indirectly. It is thus legitimate to examine sexual autonomy as a form of bodily autonomy.
SSP AND AUTONOMY AS INTEGRATED SEXUAL PERSPECTIVE

Catriona Mackenzie’s view on bodily autonomy follows from her assertion that the self is strongly embodied through what she calls *bodily perspective* (2001, 425). With this term, Mackenzie aims to capture the various strands that constitute our embodiment. These include foremost the changing and unchanging biological facts of our bodies, such as our height, eye color, or—to relate this to sexuality and desire—penis size (Mackenzie 2001, 425). This is called the *biological significance* of our bodies. Although these facts are given, their significance and the effects they have on one’s life depends on two other factors. There is, first, the way in which individuals themselves engage with the biological givens of their body, i.e., how they see their bodies and the choices they make regarding them. Mackenzie terms this facet of our bodily perspective the *personal significance* of our bodies (2001, 426). This personal significance is likely influenced by the third facet of our embodiment: the *social and cultural significance* of our bodies. This term captures how those around us, as well as society as a whole, respond to and relate to our bodies (Mackenzie 2001, 426). For example, whether someone is comfortable with their penis size depends on whether they see it as adequate, but also on how sexual partners respond to it. I will refer to the specific bodily perspective relating to our sexuality and desire as a *sexual perspective*.

To Mackenzie, one necessary condition of autonomy is the integration of these different strands or ensuring that there is no discrepancy between the social, personal, and biological significance of our bodies—and by extension our sexual perspective (2001, 429). Such a discrepancy, which is likely informed by the disproportionate presence of one of the three significances, would lead to an experience of alienation, which results in a reduced sense of agency (Mackenzie 2001, 429). To return to the example of penis size: when sexual partners repeatedly mock one’s penis, it is likely for someone to feel insecure about it or alienated from it. This in turn may make them feel unable to have pleasurable sex, thus reducing their experience of agency. Let us call this discrepancy or disintegration in terms of sexuality and desire a *disintegrated sexual perspective*. Mitigating this alienation requires the alignment of the different strands of our sexual perspective to ensure they are in accord with one another and do not present us with different messages and meanings about our sex, desire, and sexuality.

Mackenzie’s account of autonomy supports the idea that SSP are, in fact, a limitation of one’s autonomy. First, it can be said that SSP themselves are symptomatic of the disintegrated sexual perspective of the person expressing them. According to this reading, someone’s SSP come from insecurities about their desirability. They may observe the high social estimation of certain traits, whilst questioning whether they have these traits. As such, there is a discrepancy between the social and personal significance of one’s body and its desirability. To compensate, they target
their SSP at people whose traits confirm their desirability. Nate, then, may pursue masculinity in himself and his sexual partners because he observes that masculinity is favoured over femininity. The distancing from femininity in oneself and others is a common response to effeminophobia in gay communities and tends to stem from men’s insecurities about femininity (Annes and Redlin 2012 164; Taywaditep 2002, 22). Accordingly, to avoid being labelled a feminine man and the consequent rejection, Nate may reject femininity in himself and others (Hunt et al. 2016, 111; Sanchez 2016, 342). He may even try to change the biological facts of his body to avoid being rejected (Lanzieri and Hildebrandt 2012, 282; Regan et al. 2021, 4). And he may look for a confirmation of his masculinity in the masculinity of others. As such, his SSP come from a fear of a potential discrepancy between the social, personal, and biological significance of Nate’s desirability, i.e., a limited sexual autonomy.

One could argue that if Nate is responding to a disintegrated sexual perspective, his pursuit of masculinity is a good thing. By adapting his SSP, Nate allows himself to align his sexual desires and desirability with what is socially signified as desirable. This alignment, by extension, could restore his sexual autonomy. Mackenzie points out, however, that integrating one’s bodily perspective per a repressive norm does not constitute autonomy (2001, 430). If anything, this leaves intact repressive norms and damages one’s capacity to critically reflect on these norms (Mackenzie 2001, 432). Indeed, it seems counterintuitive to state that Nate has achieved autonomy by internalizing and aligning himself with those norms that previously made him insecure. This is complicated somewhat by the intuition that Nate has a right to want to feel comfortable with whom he is, even if that comes from an internalization of oppressive norms.

We must keep in mind, however, that Nate’s SSP concern not merely himself but also others. Indeed, Mackenzie’s work helps us understand that SSP are also objectionable because they may contribute to the disintegration of other people’s sexual perspectives. The expression of SSP reifies the social significance of someone’s characteristics as desirable or undesirable. That is, by internalizing a norm and thereby accepting it as valid, one is bound to externalize or express this same norm through their SSP. This reproduces said norm as legitimate or seemingly natural and imposes it upon others (see e.g., Machery 2014, 90). This is what the social significance of one’s sexual perspective seems to amount to. The reified social significance can—and often does—conflict with someone’s biological givens or their personal perspective on these givens and as such engenders disintegration of their sexual perspective and a sense of alienation regarding themselves as a sexual agent. Thus, by expressing a preference for masculine men, Nate also signifies a rejection of feminine men, which makes concrete the heteronormative idea that men should be masculine to be viable sexual partners. The result for Irwin is an experienced
discrepancy between whom he feels he needs to be to be considered desirable (a masculine man) and whom he experiences himself to be (a more feminine man) as well as an increased sense of insecurity about his agency as a sexual partner (see e.g., Kimmel and Mahalik 2005, 1185). Expressing SSP thus reifies a norm that can contribute to the disintegration of another’s sexual perspective.

From the above, it becomes clear that SSP are not constitutive of one’s sexual autonomy; it is more likely that they are the opposite. Because they are the result of one’s disintegrated bodily perspective and result in the disintegration of someone else’s sexual perspective, SSP are a symptom and perpetuation of limited sexual autonomy. As such, the tension between our duty to examine our SSP and our right to sexual autonomy dissipates, and the moral weight of Srinivasan’s call to critically examine our desires increases. We owe it to ourselves and others to do so were we to truly promote the sexual autonomy we deem so important.

When I say that we are responsible for our SSP and the sexual autonomy of ourselves and that of others, I refer primarily to forward-looking responsibility (see e.g., Young 2006, 117). While it is important to understand how one may perpetuate the limitation of others’ and one’s own sexual autonomy, it is more important to understand that we all have a responsibility to mitigate this limitation (Young 2006, 119). As such, having SSP may not warrant significant moral blame— all of us are, after all, impacted by larger oppressive structures that shape our SSP—though we can certainly regret that people have them (Young 2006, 116). Nonetheless, such preferences remain objectionable. Therefore, it is fair to demand critical engagement and a potential change in preferences. This also means that an unwillingness to adopt such forward-looking responsibility and to engage in such reflection can and should be met with moral blame. Taking these steps is just one facet of a general movement toward social justice. The limitation of sexual autonomy is in itself not the most fundamental social issue of our times, and its mitigation therefore carries moderate moral weight. Nonetheless, it is fair to say that aspiring to social justice as a whole is one of the most fundamental obligations we have towards ourselves and others. It is this obligation that I take to carry an undeniable moral weight. Similarly, and by extension, the movement towards a sexually just society in which everyone feels at home in their bodies, their sexuality, and their desires, demands that we reflect on our SSP and their harmful preferences to do what we can in bringing about a positive change.
TOO LITTLE OR TOO MUCH

One may agree with my diagnosis above but reject my conclusions. One possible rejection may consist of the response that critical reflection may not be enough for achieving sexual autonomy. A critical reader may respond that our SSP are shaped and reinforced by material conditions and structural conditions, such as media and the rise of digital dating platforms, and that critical reflection lacks the power to impact these. Indeed, critical reflection itself lacks a material dimension and may not free individuals from the sources, catalysts, and impacts of our SSP. We cannot magically think away Grindr’s filter options, for example. This shows that practical interventions, on an individual and a structural level, are crucial in resolving SSP and their effects. Nonetheless, critical reflection is a valuable point of departure. It can help us understand the nature of our SSP and how they may be rooted in our insecurities, as well as how they affect others. They can also help us understand where the alienating effects of SSP manifest most strikingly, thus guiding where material intervention is needed most. As such, Srinivasan’s call for reflection marks the beginning but not the end of the promotion of sexual autonomy.

Another critical reader might respond that a call for a critical examination of our SSP demands too much from the individual. They could endorse the view that SSP are objectionable, but may pose that individuals are not capable of the required critical reflectivity. Mackenzie herself would support such a claim. According to her, the problem with repressive norms is precisely that they interfere with our capacity to critically reflect (Mackenzie 2001, 432). Through our internalization of norms, we come to see these norms and thus the SSP flowing from them as legitimate, even when they are not so. This means that, even when we can recognize societal expectations, we may not be able to understand the extent to which they are harmful and are urged to align ourselves with them (Mackenzie 2001, 432). Thus, because SSP rest on and reproduce repressive norms, reflecting on them becomes rather difficult, if not impossible. Demanding critical reflection, therefore, rests on a naïve understanding of individuals’ agency in the face of norms.

I cannot deny the difficulty of reflecting on repressive norms, but I do believe that a Mackenzian reply would be overly pessimistic and simplistic. People are capable of reflecting on how norms shape their sexuality and desires. In fact, a heightened experience of norms and their harmful effects may even strengthen our ability to understand and resist such norms and to imagine positive and liberating alternatives. This has been a central aim, for example, of people who identify as queer. The very idea of queerness was born out of the observation that mainstream gay and lesbian communities adhered to heteronorms which served to uphold rather than displace the primacy of heterosexuality and the subsequent oppression of other sexualities and gender identifications (Seidman 1995, 124). As a specific identity category, queerness is aimed at
addressing, dissecting, and resisting norms concerning gender, sex, and sexuality (Jagose 1996, 1). Individuals have introduced queerness into their lived experience by playfully engaging with and resisting the norms that they encountered. Queer individuals have reported a heightened experience of freedom and a sense of responsibility to respect the identities of others without imposing norms on them (Stone 2013). Insisting that critical reflection demands too much of the individual, obscures these facts and absolves individuals of their responsibility all too easily.

Although we cannot possibly expect everyone to suddenly ‘become’ queer, queer people do exemplify that it is possible and liberating to respect our moral duty to reflect on sex and sexual preferences. Consider Amy Stone’s discussion of the members of a queer sex club in a U.S. city. In this queer space, individuals simultaneously explored their sexuality and resisted heteronormative and transphobic norms by playfully subverting labels and expectations and by detaching their preferences from the bodies that other attending members have (Stone 2013, 1654). The members of this queer space exemplify that realizing one’s sexual autonomy and bearing responsibility towards others can go hand in hand and can be experienced as liberating, although their efforts naturally came with limitations (Stone 2013, 1662). This is only one example, but it shows the possibility of critical reflection and suggests that such engagements may result in heightened sexual autonomy of others as well. There are undoubtedly ways outside of queerness to do so too, but adopting a playful and antinormative stance certainly seems like a proper starting point for guiding our duty to reflect. Such reflections can mark the beginning of a transformation in the way that we engage with desires. They can allow us to move away from objectionable preferences towards a relationship with desire and sexuality that celebrates our own identity and autonomy and that of others.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper has been to problematize Selective Sexual Preferences. It has done so by first highlighting the apparent tension between the politicalness and objectionability of our desires and our right to sexual autonomy. This tension relies on a liberal conception of autonomy and dissipates when we adopt an alternative view of autonomy that respects the embodied nature of our sexuality and sexual desires. Extending Mackenzie’s autonomy as integrated bodily perspective to SSP revealed that SSP are not merely the expression of someone’s disintegrated sexual perspective—and by extension, someone’s limited autonomy—but that the practice of SSP also limits the autonomy of others. This is what makes SSP morally objectionable. Moreover, this shows that sexual autonomy and the moral duty of critical reflection are mutually supportive rather than in tension, as exemplified by the queer individuals that engage with norms daily. As
such, it should be clear that SSP are morally objectionable because they signify a limitation of sexual autonomy and that we owe it to ourselves and others to critically reflect.

My conclusion opens the door to new and complicated questions. Since we all have SSP, does that mean we all have limited sexual autonomy, and to what extent? Moreover, how do we distinguish between those SSP that are morally objectionable and those that are less so? For example, is it as objectionable for gay men to only desire men as it is to pursue masculine men exclusively? Relatedly, how do we work to overcome some SSP whilst respecting that people have fought hard for the right to have others? This paper cannot provide the answer to these questions but does urge its readers to reflect upon them, as difficult as that may be. In general, a grounded evaluation of SSP seems to require some account of the good and how SSP undermine it. While this paper cannot provide such an account, it has implied several lines along which it may be developed. It seems intuitive, for example, that those selective preferences that mirror oppressive norms and structures can be considered objectionable and that we have reason to demand their abolition. It also seems that practices should be aimed at respecting a more holistic conception of sexual autonomy individual practices as well as the social context that ground these practices. The formulation of a robust moral framework requires more investigation and argumentation, however.

Nonetheless, this paper can sharpen our understanding of the possibly morally objectionable nature of sexual preferences. When Grindr allows its users to filter users based on body type and weight, it actively supports the limitation of people’s autonomy. This can hardly be morally permissible. Increasing the demands placed on autonomy reveals to us the severity of this situation and emphasises our responsibility. Although some may call this a form of authoritarian moralism, I suspect it is much more authoritarian to ask us to accept an immoral situation in which the sexual autonomy of individuals is limited to such an extent that they doubt their subjectivity. It is crucial that we resist such a situation by reconfiguring the relationship to our sexual desires, promoting critical reflection, and restoring and celebrating the integration of our sexual perspective.

REFERENCES


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I use this term here not to refer to the amalgamation of LGBTQIA+ identities, but rather to refer to those who identify as queer, specifically.